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Historical Quirks, Political Opportunism, and the 
Anti· Loan Provision of the Sarbanes ... Qxley Act 
lAYNE W. BARNARD• 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Legislation often has surprising origins. For example, the story is told 
that Governor Nelson Rockefeller devised his infamous "Rockefeller drug 
laws" on the slimmest thread of background information. 
At a party in March, 1972, Rockefeller had chatted with William 
Fine, then the president of Bon wit Teller. The two men talked about 
narcotics-a topic Fine was especially interested in because his son 
was an addict. Rockefeller asked him to go to Japan and figure out 
why that nation had the world's lowest rate of addiction. Fine 
financed his own trip and returned with an answer: lifetime prison 
sentences for drug sellers. 1 
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William & Mary class of 2004, and Mark B. Carson, Kerry Eaton, Heidi Brown, and Carl Beattie, all of 
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Tucker, who (as always) wielded his editing pen to improve the manuscript. Thanks finally to Justin 
Dillmore and Peg Schultz for their hospitality at Ohio Northern University and to Michael Palumbo and 
Erica Veljic for their editing help. 
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I . JENNIFER GoNNERMAN, l.JFE ON THE OliTSIDE: THE PRisON ODYSSEY OF ELAINE BARTLETI 52 
Rockefeller's staff balked at the news of this proposal, but he refused to listen to any of their 
doubts. [According to Rockefeller's former speechwriter,] [h]is drug proposal became an 
"are you with me or against me" test of loyalty, and staffers quickly realized that if they did 
not implement the governor's plan, they would have to start polishing their resumes. "I 
never fully understood the psychological milieu in which the chain of errors in Vietnam was 
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Another story has been told of how the word "sex" was included as a 
protected class in Title VII just hours before Congress passed the statute. 
According to Congressional folklore, its inclusion was a joke. 2 
This is the story of another piece oflegislation that has surprising origins: 
the anti-loan provision of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.3 In this article, I will 
review the drumbeat of events and political steps that led to the enactment of 
the anti-loan provision, suggest some of the questions that were neither asked 
nor answered prior to its enactment, and describe some of the problems that 
have emerged in its wake. 
I tell this story in the shadow of an elegant new book by Malcolm 
Gladwell called Blink: The Power ofThinking without Thinking.4 In his book, 
Gladwell extolls the power of intuitive thinking, the "rightness" of first 
impressions, and the benefits of snap judgments. According to Gladwell, 
acting on only the smallest bits of information-what he calls "thin-slicing" 
-"often delivers a better answer than more deliberate and exhaustive ways 
of thinking. "5 
In this article, I will ask whether the "thin slicing" that led to enactment 
of the anti-loan provision in the summer of 2002 offers an example of Glad-
well's theory. That is, I will ask whether enactment of the anti-loan provision, 
which occurred virtually overnight, resulted in a "blatantly needed [and over-
due] reform"6 or, as critics have recently suggested, a classic case of 
forged until I became involved in the Rockefeller drug proposal." 
2. BARBARA WHALEN & CHARLES WHALEN, THE LoNGEST DEBATE: A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF 
THE 1964CIVn..RlGHTSAcr233-34(1985); see also 110CONG. REc. 2581 (1964) (statement of Rep. Edith 
Green) (suggesting that Rep. Howard W. Smith proposed to insert "sex" in the bill to prevent the passage 
of Title Vll). But see Michael C. Falk, Note, Lost in the Language: The Conflict Between the 
Congressional Purpose and Statutory Language of Federal Employment Discrimination Legislation, 35 
RUTGERSL. J. 1179, 1189 n.35 (2004) (noting recent scholarship arguing that the inclusion of"sex" in the 
bill was strategic and not a joke). 
3. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of2002, § 402, 15 U.S.C. § 78m(k) (2004). 
4. See generally MALCOLM GLADWEll, BLINK: THE POWER OF THINKING WITHOUT THINKING 
(2005). 
5. /d. at 34. To be fair, Gladwell also discusses some of the perils of ''thin slicing" and snap 
judgments: erroneous judgments based on racial prejudice, hideous mistakes made under stress, and 
decision making limited by comfort, custom, and familiarity. 
6. Sean A. Power, Comment, Sarbanes-Oxley Ends Corporate Lending to Insiders: Some 
Interpretive Issues for Executive Compensation Surrounding the Section 402 Loan Prohibition, 71 UMKC 
L. REv. 911 , 912 (2003). 
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"overreaction,"7"a case of severe [legislative] overreaching,''8 and a "public 
policy error. "9 
II. THE ANTI-LOAN PROVISION OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT 
The anti-loan provision of Sarbanes-Oxley is straightforward: 
It shall be unlawful for any issuer ... directly or indirectly, including 
through any subsidiary, to extend or maintain credit, to arrange for the 
extension of credit, or to renew an extension of credit, in the form of 
a personal loan to or for any director or executive officer (or equiva-
lent thereof) of that issuer. An extension of credit maintained by the 
issuer on the date of enactment of this subsection shall not be subject 
to the provisions of this subsection, provided that there is no material 
modification to any term of any such extension of credit or any 
renewal of any such extension of credit on or after that date [ ... ] . 10 
This provision was as close as Congress was willing to come in the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act to reining in what was seen in the decade leading up to 
the enactment of the statute as excessive executive compensation.•• Its 
passage "proved very disruptive of standard arrangements at many corpora-
tions."12 
Congressional interest in insider loans first surfaced during Senate hear-
ings into the Enron disaster in February, 2002, when former SEC Chairman 
Richard Breeden testified before the Senate Banking Committee, and 
recommended both increased disclosure of insider loans and, in some cases, 
shareholder approval of those loans. 13 But the story leading up to enactment 
of the anti-loan provision, like the stories underlying many pieces of federal 
7. Lawrence A. Cunningham, The Sarbanes-Oxley Yawn: Heavy Rhetoric, Light Reform (And It 
Might Just Work), 36 U. CONN. L. REV. 9I5, 927 (2003). 
8. M. Todd Henderson & James C. Spindler, Corporate Heroin: A Defense of Perks, Executive 
Loans, and Conspicuous Consumption, at http://ssm.com/abstract=597661 (forthcoming 2005). 
9. Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-OxleyActand the Making of Quack Corporate Governance, 
http://ssm.com/abstract=596101 (forthcoming 2005). 
10. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(k) (2004). 
II . See Janice Kay McClendon, Bringing the Bulls to Bear: Executive Compensation to Realign 
Management and Shareholders' Interests and Promote Corporate Long-Term Productivity, 39 WAKE 
FOREST L. REV. 971, 1001-02 (2004) ("[The anti-loan] prohibition is designed as an indirect means of 
limiting corporate executives' ability to acquire equity stakes without out-of-pocket expenditures .... This 
prohibition is also designed to address a disturbing trend of corporate debt forgiveness."). 
12. Roberta S. Karmei, The Securities and Exchange Commission Goes Abroad to Regulate 
Corporate Governance, 33 STETSON L. REv. 849, 868 (2004). 
13. See Romano, supra note 9, at 150-52 (describing early, very superficial, discussions of insider 
loans during Senate hearings). 
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legislation, is not linear. It begins with the unraveling of several large public 
companies in 2001-2002, all of which had made significant loans to their 
officers or directors. Then, some unseemly revelations about President 
George W. Bush's personal business dealings in the late 1980s, a plummeting 
stock market, and a grandstanding Senator all converged on a jittery Congress 
in July, 2002, when the anti-loan provision was proposed and adopted without 
so much as an intelligent conversation. Here, in a nutshell, are the critical 
points leading up to enactment of the anti-loan provision. 
ill. THE ORIGINS OF THE ANTI-LOAN PROVISION 
What were the origins of the anti-loan provision? I'd like to claim that 
a 1988 law review article criticizing insider loans 14 played some role. More 
likely, however, the origins of the anti-loan provision can be traced, as the Act 
itself can be traced, to the unfolding of the Enron story in the fall of 2001 and 
the scandals that followed: W orldCom, Tyco, and Adelphia. It can also be 
traced to a series of bankruptcy filings of high-profile public companies. 
Between July, 2001, and December, 2002, seven suchcompanies-Comdisco, 
Enron, K-Mart, Global Crossing, Adelphia, WorldCom, and Conseco--were 
found to have extended massive loans to their officers and directors, many of 
them later "forgiven."15 
A. The Back Story 
1. The "Big Four" Scandals 
The story of the anti-loan provision begins with the disclosure that Ken 
Lay, Chairman of Enron Corporation, had received some $81.5 million in 
loans from the company during the period 2000-2001.16 Lay repaid these 
loans with shares of Enron stock, which permitted him to avoid contem-
poraneous disclosure of his sales. As described in the report of the Senate 
Governmental Affairs Committee, 
[Enron's] Compensation Committee had already given Mr. Lay a 4 
million line of credit which, in August 2001, it increased to $7.5 
million. During their interviews, the Committee members said that 
they knew of the line of credit, but had been unaware that, in 2000, 
Mr. Lay began using what one Board member called an "ATM 
14. Jayne W. Barnard, Corporate Loans to Directors and Officers: Every Business Now a Bank?, 
1988 W1s. L. REv. 237 (1988). 
15. See infra Section IDA. 
16. Mitchell Pacelle, Enron 's Disclosure of Awards to Top Officials Draws Outrage, WALL ST. J., 
June 18, 2002, at CIS. 
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approach" toward that credit line, repeatedly drawing down the entire 
amount available and then repaying the loan with Enron stock. 
Records show that Mr. Lay at frrst drew down the line of credit once 
per month, then every two weeks, and then, on some occasions, 
several days in a row. In the one-year period from October 2000 to 
October 2001, Mr. Lay used the credit line to obtain over $77 million 
in cash from the company and repaid the loans exclusively with Enron 
stock. Several Directors confrrmed that Mr. Lay still owed the 
company about $7 million.17 
329 
Another company whose insider loans drew widespread attention was 
WorldCom, Inc. In March, 2002, the company revealed that, beginning in 
2000 and throughout 2001, it had loaned its Chairman and CEO, Bernard J. 
Ebbers, nearly $350 million to cover personal debts.18 The WorldCom loans 
required payment of interest at below-market rates (estimated at 2.15% )19 and 
were unsecured. "Never before, apparently, had a board of directors lent so 
much cash to the board's own chairman .... "20 
The loans were later detailed in the company's proxy statement, 
concurrent with the announcement of Ebbers' resignation. 21 They included 
$198.7 million paid to Bank of America to reduce Ebbers' personal debts, $35 
million deposited to collateralize a letter of credit in favor of Ebbers, and $165 
million loaned directly to Ebbers.22 The proxy explained that the board had 
approved the loans and related commitments "following a determination that 
they were in the best interests of WorldCom and our shareholders ... .'723 
The story behind the loans was this: Ebbers had borrowed privately from 
Bank of America, using his WorldCom stock for collateral. When 
WorldCom's share price began dropping in 2000, Ebbers faced a margin call 
and sold some three million shares of World Com stock. 24 When the share 
price continued to fall, 
17. The Role of the Board of Directors in Enron' s Collapse: Report Prepared by the Permanent 
Subcommittee on Investigations of the Committee on Governmental Affairs, S. REP. No. 107-70, at 53 
(2002), available at http://www.senate.gov/-gov_affairs/070702enronreport.pdf. 
18. Joann S. Lublin & Shawn Young, WorldCom Loan to CEO of $341 Million Is the Most 
Generous in Recent Memory, WALL ST. J., Mar. 15, 2002, at A3. 
19. Peter Siris, Loans, Options: Double Trouble, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Mar. 25, 2002, at 38. 
20. Geoffrey Colvin, Money Woes Strike Ex-CEO's: Bernie Ebbers Owes WorldCom $408 Million 
and Can't Pay, FORTUNE, June 24, 2002, at 48. 
21. WorldCom, Inc., Proxy Statement, Apr. 22, 2002, at 13-15. 
22. /d. at 14. 
23. /d. 
24. Joann S. Lublin & Jared Sandberg, Deadbeat CEOs Plague Firms as Economy and Markets 
Roil, WAll ST. J ., Aug. 1, 2002, at A 1. 
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WorldCom' s directors began to worry about what would happen if 
Mr. Ebbers kept selling stock. They discussed the possibility that the 
price of WorldCom stock would drop on news that Mr. Ebbers was 
dumping his shares, according to several board members. Directors 
also were concerned that if Mr. Ebbers continued to sell his shares it 
would wipe him out financially and leave him without a stake in the 
company he ran.25 
Thus, the board decided to guarantee $100 million of Ebbers' loan and later 
loaned him an additional $100 million, all with the intention of forestalling an 
Ebbers sell-off of WorldCom stock.26 Then, without much further thought on 
the subject, "the guarantee and the loan grew over time.'m Ultimately, the 
price ofWorldCom stock continued to decline and WorldCom was forced to 
pay Bank of America $198.7 million to cover the loans it had guaranteed.28 
By April, 2002, Ebbers was indebted to the company for $402 million (includ-
ing accrued interest), with little likelihood that he would ever be able to meet 
his obligations.29 The company soon thereafter filed for protection under 
Chapter 11, the biggest bankruptcy in American history. 30 It turned out that 
WorldCom's financial statements had been overstated by some $11 billion.31 
(Bernie Ebbers was ultimately convicted of securities and wire fraud). 32 
In addition to the Lay and Ebbers insider loans there was also another 
rapacious CEO, Dennis Kozlowski ofTyco, International, Inc. Who, in June, 
2002, resigned in the face of allegations that he had used company 
funds-borrowed from a corporate account intended for other purposes-to 
purchase millions of dollars in artwork for his home. 33 Kozlowski was 
25. ld. 
26. ld. 
27. ld. 
28. ld. 
29. See Colvin, supra note 20; World Com, Inc., Proxy Statement, supra note 21 (stating that Ebbers 
was scheduled to repay the loans on the following schedule: $25 million on Apr. 29, 2003,$25 million on 
Apr. 29, 2004; $75 million on Apr. 29, 2005, $100 million on Apr. 29, 2006 and all remaining principal 
on Apr. 29, 2007). 
30. Andrew Backover, WorldCom Files for Chapter 11 Protection, USA TODAY, July 22, 2002, at 
1A. 
31. Christopher Stem, WorldComAuditors Find More Errors: $3.8 Billion Added to Earlier Total, 
WASH. POST, Aug. 9, 2002, at Al. 
32. Brooke A. Masters, WorldCom 's Ebbers Convicted: Jury Finds Former CEO Guilty on All Nine 
Counts, WASH. POST, Mar. 16,2005, at Al. 
33. Alex Berenson, Tyco Chief Out as Tax Inquiry Picks Up Speed, N.Y. TIMEs, June 4, 2002, at 
Al. 
2005] HISTORICAL QUIRKS 331 
ultimately indicted for tax fraud for failing to pay the required sales tax on the 
artwork.34 
At first, it was reported that the funds Kozlowski had used to purchase 
his paintings were borrowed from Tyco through an executive loan program 
that was "supposed to be used for a different purpose helping top employees 
pay taxes that become due upon the vesting, or taking full ownership, of 
restricted stock awards. "35 According to one critic, the fund was not supposed 
to be used "where the company serves as a bank for employees to use for 
personal purposes."36 
As the story unfolded, though, Kozlowski's misuse of insider loans 
seemed even more remarkable than had at first been reported. First, 
Kozlowski was alleged to have borrowed some $270 million-not just $13 
million-from a loan program intended to help him pay taxes on restricted 
stock grants. Prosecutors claimed he had used 90% of the borrowed funds to 
purchase a yacht, jewelry, fine art, and real estate.37 Then, they alleged, 
Kozlowski borrowed an additional $46 million in interest-free "relocation" 
loans, which he used to buy luxury properties in New Hampshire, 
Connecticut, Massachusetts, and Manhattan. 38 Other executives, too, were 
alleged to have abused Tyco's relocation loan fund.39 (The criminal case 
against Kozlowski ended in a mistrial and is currently being retried).40 
One more scandal fed into this sorry mix. On March 27, 2002, Adelphia 
Communications Corporation, a national cable television provider, filed a 
report with the SEC in which it revealed for the first time that the family of 
John J. Rigas, founder and CEO of Adelphia, had extracted billions of dollars 
from the company for his personal use.41 Some of the problem involved loans 
made or guaranteed by the company without the knowledge of the board of 
directors. 42 The Rigases had also used corporate funds to finance unrelated 
34. Mark Maremont & Jerry Mark on, Ex-Tyco Chief Evaded $1 Million in Taxes on Art, Indictment 
Says, WALL ST. J ., June 5, 2002, at A 1. 
35. Mark Maremont et al., Probe of Ex-Tyco Chief Focuses on Improper Use of Company Funds, 
WALL ST. J., June 6, 2002, at AI. 
36. Maremont & Markon, supra note 34, at AI (quoting Washington securities lawyer Alan Dye). 
37. Mark Maremont & Jerry Markon, Fonner Tyco Executives Are Charged, WALL ST. J ., Sept. 13, 
2002, at A3. 
38. Id. 
39. Laurie P. Cohen & John Hechinger, Tyco Suits Say Clandestine Facts Led to Payments, WALL 
ST. J., June 18, 2002, at A3. 
40. Walter Hamilton, Re-trial of Tyco Ex-Executives Starts: A New York Prosecutor Says the 
Former CEO and Finance Chief Stole $150 Million to Finance Their Luxury Lifestyles, L.A. TIMEs, Jan. 
27,2005, at C3. 
41. See Adelphia Communications Corp. v. Rigas, Case No. 02-41729 (REG), U.S. Bankr., S.D. 
N.Y., Compl. (on file with author). 
42. ld. at Tli 71, 78, liS, 117. 
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business ventures,43 to pay for relatives' living quarters in New York,44 to 
engage in extravagant family travel,45 and to purchase Adelphia stock on the 
open market.46 After a forensic accounting ordered by the frrm's board of 
directors, the company sued the Rigases, alleging "one of the largest cases of 
corporate looting and self-dealing in American corporate history. "47 The 
Rigases were also charged by the SEC with securities fraud and "rampant self-
dealing."48 And the U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York 
indicted the Rigases, alleging mail fraud, bank fraud, wire fraud, and 
securities fraud.49 The government claimed the family had used the company 
as its "personal piggy bank" 5° and engaged in a "wide variety of ... brazen 
thefts."51 (Ultimately, John Rigas and his son Timothy were convicted of 
these crimes, and recently agreed to forfeit $1.5 billion to settle the civil 
claims against them. 52 The company filed for Chapter 11 protection in June, 
2002).53 
2. Four More Troubling Bankruptcies 
During the period of July, 2001 through December, 2002, not only did 
Enron, W orldCom, and Adelphia file for protection under Chapter 11, four 
more high-profile companies did the same, and each one revealed that it, too, 
had extended significant insider loans to its executives. 
The first of these was Comdisco, Inc., a high-tech security company. 
During the Internet boom, Comdisco had loaned 106 of its employees some 
$104 million to purchase the company's stock. When the Internet bubble 
burst, and the price of the stock plunged, the loans remained outstanding. Not 
only did Comdisco face bankruptcy (it filed in the summer of 2001), so did 
many of its employees. 54 
43. !d. at 1:89. 
44. /d. at<JI 105. 
45. /d. at 1: 104. 
46. /d. at <JI 74. 
47. Adelphia Communications Corp., Compl. at ')l2. 
48. SEC Charges Adelphia and Rigas Family with Massive Financial Fraud, SEC Press Release 
2002-110, available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2002-IIO.htm. 
49. See Jerry Mark on & Robert Frank, Five Adelphia Officials Arrested on Fraud Charges, WALL 
ST. J., July 25, 2002, at A3. 
50. Carrie Johnson & Christopher Stem, Adelphia Founder, Sons Charged: Family Looted Sixth 
Lorgest Cable 7Y Company, U.S. Says, WASH. POST, July 25, 2002, at AI. 
51. /d. 
52. Sallie Hofmeister, Adelphia 's Founders to Forfeit Assets, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 26, 2005, at AI. 
53. Deborah Solomon, Adelphia Communications Files for Bankruptcy-Court Protection, WAU.. 
ST. J., June 26, 2002, at A3. 
54. Howard Wolinsky, Ex-Comdisco Execs Sued over Loans: lAwsuits Target 76 Who Borrowed 
$74 Million to Buy Company Stock, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Feb. 8, 2005, at 43. 
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K-Mart Corporation filed under Chapter 11 in January, 2002. The press 
reported that several of its executives had received more than $30 million in 
"retention loans" just prior to the bankruptcy filing. 55 The idea was that, by 
offering "retention loans," K-Mart would dissuade its best executives from 
leaving the company while it was struggling in Chapter 11. In theory, loan re-
payment would be forgiven if the executives stayed for the duration of there-
organization proceeding. But more than $18 million of the total loan amount 
went to executives who left the company within weeks of the Chapter 11 
filing. 56 K-Mart later sued to recover some of the outstanding loans. 57 
Just one week after K-Mart's bankruptcy filing, Global Crossing Ltd., a 
telecorrununications frrm, also filed under Chapter 11. Soon, the press report-
ed that the company had forgiven a $10 million interest-free loan to its CEO, 
John Legere, just weeks before filing for bankruptcy protection. 58 In this case, 
the loan had been made as part of a "signing bonus. "59 One more company 
emerged with insider loan issues during the summer of 2002. Conseco, Inc., 
a financial services company, revealed that, beginning in 1996, it had 
guaranteed some $700 million in loans to 155 of its executives to enable them 
to purchase Conseco shares.60 Beginning in 2001, the value of the shares 
began to drop, and the borrowers soon had no reasonable hope of repayment.61 
The company's guarantee obligation contributed to Conseco's bankruptcy 
filing in December, 2002.62 (The company later engaged in a bitter lawsuit 
with its former CEO to recover the unpaid amount of the loan, and is now in 
the process of executing its $72 million judgment).63 
55. Amy Merrick, K-Mart Officers Got Big Loans Before It Filed for Chapter 11, WAIL ST. I., Apr. 
17,2002, at Bl. 
56. /d. 
57. Rachel Katz, Restructuring Kmart Names New CEO: President Julian Day Replaces James 
Adamson in Taking Firm Out of Chapter 11, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 20, 2003, at Bus. 3. 
58. Elizabeth Douglass, Global Eased Loan Terms: Compensation: The Firm Forgave or Reduced 
Advances to Executives in the Months Before its Chapter 11 Filing, L.A. TIMEs, Feb. 7, 2002, at C 1. Ac-
cording to the recipient, John Legere, the loan "was never designed to be repaid ... and was set up as a loan 
solely for tax reasons." Elizabeth Douglass, Big Payday for CEO as Firm Sinks: Telecom Global Cross-
ing's John Legere Gets Millions, Including a Promotion Severance, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 13,2002, at AI. 
59. Rebecca Blumens & Deborah Solomon, As Global Crossing Crashed, Executives Got Loan 
Relief, Pension Payouts, WAIL ST. J., Feb. 21,2002, at Bl. 
60. Bill W. Hornaday, Write-Offs Drive Loss at Conseco: CEO Gary Wendt Cites $98.1 Million in 
Charges in Disappointing Quarter, but Says Turnaround is on Track, INDIANAPOUS STAR, Feb. 22, 2002, 
at Bus. lC. 
61. Aoyd Norris, 3 Ex-Chiefs Discover the Perils of Borrowing and Believing, N.Y. TIMES, May 
16, 2002, at C I. 
62. J.K Wall, Hilbert Ruling Ominous for "Big 11 ,": Similarities of Ex-Conseco Brass's Cases 
Key, INDIANAPOUS STAR, Nov. 15, 2004, at IC. 
63. I. K. Wall, Hilbert's Leftovers Go Up for Auction: About $10,000 Worth of Items That Were 
Not Sold in the First Event Will beAvailable Today,INDIANAPOUS STAR, Mar. 7, 2005, at 1C. 
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These eight cases-and especially the "big four" scandals-painted an 
ugly picture of insider loans. It would have been fair on this evidence to 
assume that insider loans were disproportionately associated with companies 
on the verge of bankruptcy, companies in which egregious accounting 
violations and other misconduct was also going on, and companies whose 
leadership posed a grave threat to public confidence in the capital markets. 
It might also have been fair to assume that the practice of making insider loans 
had grown totally out of control.64 
B. President Bush's Response to Concerns about Corporate Greed 
The Bush administration responded reluctantly to the clamor for 
corporate governance reform that emerged following the collapse of Enron. 
On March 7, 2002, President Bush announced his reform agenda, emphasizing 
the need for responsible self-governance rather than specific corrective 
legislation. "The whole design of free-market capitalism depends upon free 
people acting responsibly," he said. "Business people must answer not just 
to the demands of the markets or self-interest but to the demands of con-
science."65 
That being said, the President did announce his support for a new federal 
agency that would monitor accounting firms and a ban on public accounting 
firms performing both audit and non-audit functions for their clients, at least 
where such work would compromise the independence of the audit. 66 He also 
called for the return by executives of performance-based compensation awards 
where a company restated earlier financial statements. 67 Finally, the President 
called for CEOs to vouch for the "veracity, timeliness and fairness" of the 
information contained in their financial statements. 68 
There was no mention of outlawing insider loans in President Bush's 
Ten-Point Plan, but then again, the revelations about insider loans at 
WorldCom, Adelphia, and Tyco were still over the horizon. 
C. Congress's Response to Concerns About Corporate Greed 
Throughout the spring of 2002, both the Senate and House conducted 
hearings on Enron and entertained dozens of legislative proposals. House 
64. According to a report published in December, 2002, insider loans had grown to the remarkable 
sum of $4.5 billion. Paul Hodgson, My Big Fat Corporate Loan, at www.thecorporatelibrary.com. 
65. Press Release, Office of White House Press Secretary, President Outlines Plan to Improve 
Corporate Responsibility (Mar. 7, 2002), at http://www. whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002103/20020307-
3.html. 
66. /d. 
67. /d. 
68. /d. 
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Democrats pressed for passage of tough regulatory bills called the Com-
prehensive Investor Protection Act69 and the Corporate Responsibility Act of 
2002.70 Ultimately, a far more moderate Republican bill-the Corporate and 
Auditing Accountability, Responsibility, and Transparency Act of 200271-
passed the House on April 24, 2002, with widespread bipartisan support. 72 
Then, the progress of post-Enron reform legislation seemed to stall.73 
The White House was preoccupied with homeland security issues, and 
Congress was equally preoccupied with issues such as the "patients' bill of 
rights." It almost seemed as if the Congress didn't notice what was happening 
in the national securities marketplace, but a simple timeline suggests what in 
fact was going on. Between April24, when the House corporate reform bill 
passed, and the second week of July, when the Senate began moving in earnest 
on corporate reform, several noteworthy events had occurred: ( 1) Tyco CEO 
Dennis Kozlowski resigned in disgrace;74 (2) WorldCom revealed that it had 
overstated its cash flow by over $3 billion dollars; 75 (3) Xerox announced that 
it, too, would be making a $1.4 billion restatement;76 (4) WorldCom's CEO 
Bernie Ebbers and CFO Scott Sullivan declined to testify in front of the House 
Financial Services Committee;77 and (5) Qwest Communications intimated 
that it would be making a $1 billion restatement. 78 
By mid-July, the Dow Jones Industrial Average was down 20% from the 
first of the year, and other major indexes were down even further.79 Both the 
S&P 500 stock index and the Dow fell to their lowest levels in five years. 80 
69. Comprehensive Investor Protection Act, H.R. 3818, 107th Cong. (2002). 
70. The Corporate Responsibility Act of 2002, H.R. 4083, l07th Cong. (2002). 
71. Corporate and Auditing Accountability, Responsibility, and Transparency Act of 2002 H.R. 
3763, 107th Cong. (2002). 
72. Michael Schroeder, House, in Bipanisan Vote, Backs Moderate Accounting Overhaul, WALL 
ST. J., Apr. 25, 2002, at A2. 
73. See David S. Hilzenrath, Senate Set for Action to Refonn Audit Sector: Corporate Scandals 
Spur Call for Tougher Rule, WASH. POST, July 7, 2002, at A1 (noting that "[j]ust weeks ago, the legislative 
fervor that followed the December collapse of Enron Corp. appeared to have cooled, and efforts to impose 
new discipline on corporate auditors seemed to have sputtered in the Senate"). 
74. Berenson, supra note 33, at Al. 
75. Simon Romero & Alex Berenson, WorldCom Says It Hid Expenses, Inflating Cash Flow $3.8 
Billion, N.Y. TIMEs, June 26,2002, at Al. 
76. Mark Maremont, Xerox Overstates Pretax Income by $1.41 Billion, Filing Reveals, WALL ST. 
J., July 1, 2002, at A3. 
77. Simon Romero & Floyd Norris, 2 Former WorldCom Executives Refuse to Testify to Congress, 
N.Y. TIMES, July 9, 2002, at Cl. 
78. Simon Romero & Kenneth N. Gilpin, New Executives May Restate Qwest Results for Last Year, 
N.Y. TIMEs, July 13,2002, at Cl. 
79. Jonathan Fuerbringer, Market Continues Four-Month Rout: Dow Plunges 390, N.Y. TIMES, July 
20, 2002, at Al. 
80. Rob Walker, Crisis, What Crisis?, N.Y. TIMES, July 14, 2002, § 4, at 4. 
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Throughout this period, no one was advocating the prohibition of insider 
loans-not even the Democrats.81 Senator Paul Sarbanes' reform bill in the 
Senate-the Public Accounting Reform and Investor Protection Act of 200282 
-did not contain an anti-loan provision. And the Report of the Democrat-
controlled Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations issued on July 
8, 2002, contained only a recommendation that directors-not the Congress-
should take steps to prevent excessive executive compensation, among other 
things, by "barring the issuance of company-financed loans to directors and 
senior officers of the company."83 The proposal was intended to be exhor-
tative, not mandatory. 
D. Embarrassing Disclosures about President Bush 
On the same day the Subcommittee's report was issued, Monday, July 8, 
2002, President Bush held a "hastily-announced" press conference whose 
purpose was to deflect questions about Bush's conduct while he was a director 
at Harken Energy Corporation. 84 The press had resuscitated a story just days 
before about the President's failure to file the required notice-of-sale 
documents when he sold some Harken shares in 1990.85 According to one 
observer, the press conference was a humiliating performance for Bush-"the 
President ... looked [like] a very naughty boy indeed."86 According to 
another observer-this one a conservative Republican-"[h ]e just didn't seem 
like he was prepared."87 His answers about Harken were "vague and 
dismissive."88 It was "the weakest, most inarticulate showing he ha[d] made 
since the early months of his presidency."89 
The next morning, Tuesday, July 9, 2002, President Bush appeared 
before a gathering of some 850 business leaders in New York City, where he 
announced his latest corporate reform initiatives. Promising "bold, well-
81. None of the Democrats' bills in the House had contained an anti-loan provision. Senator Carl 
Levin (D-Mich.) introduced a bill that would require 8-K disclosure of any insider loan within 48 hours of 
the making or forgiveness of the loan. See Shareholder Bill of Rights Act, S. 2460, I 07th Congress (2002). 
82. Public Accounting Reform and Investor Protection Act of2002, S. 2673, I 07th Congress (2002). 
83. S. REP. No. 107-70, supra note 17, at4. 
84. Elisabeth Bumiller & Richard A. Oppel Jr., Bush Defends Sale of Stock and Vows to Enhance 
S.E.C., N.Y. TIMEs, July 9, 2002, at At. 
85. Elisabeth Bumiller, Bush Faces Scrutiny over Disclosing '90 Stock Sale Late, N.Y. TIMES, July 
4, 2002, at All. 
86. Hendrik Hertzberg, Street Smarts, NEW YORKER, July 22, 2002, at 23. 
87. David L. Greene, Scandals Present Dilemma for Bush: President Warns Firms Against Fraud 
and Goes on Defensive about His Past; Seen as Potential Election Issue, BALT. SUN, July 14, 2002, at lA 
(quoting Michael Franc, vice president for governmental relations at the Heritage Foundation). 
88. Bumiller & Oppel, supra note 84. 
89. DavidS. Broder, Wobbly Words, WASH. POST, July 14,2002, at B7. 
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considered reforrns,"90 the President announced the creation of the Corporate 
Fraud Task Force and committed himself to increased penalties for securities 
law violators.91 One journalist noted: 
[The President] handled the preliminaries with affable aplomb. But 
the text itself he read in a joyless monotone, without inflection or 
conviction. The remedies he outlined were the feeblest he could 
afford to offer. He made no mention of such obvious steps as making 
corporations count stock options as an expense and preventing 
accounting firms from doubling as consultants to companies they 
audit. Some of his proposals (like requiring that a dishonest executive 
be convicted in criminal court before being barred from future service 
as an officer or a director of a public company) were weaker versions 
of measures that have been recommended by the S.E.C.' s professional 
staff or that are currently being rushed through Congress. Others (like 
calling for annual reports to describe a C.E.O. 's "compensation 
package" in plain English) are purely voluntary and therefore close to 
meaningless. The main emphasis was on tougher-or tougher sound-
ing-enforcement, notably a new "financial crimes SWAT team," an 
additional hundred million dollars for the S.E.C., and more prison 
time for wire and mail fraud. Even in this there was less than met the 
ear. The SWAT team will be essentially an information clearing 
house, and will involve no new net resources. The extra hundred 
million for the S.E.C. may be more than the increase that was called 
for in the President's last budget (i.e., zero), but it's barely a third of 
what Senate Democrats are proposing. 92 
The President also spoke briefly on the subject of loans. He proposed the 
immediate cessation of insider loans, as a matter of corporate policy, not as a 
matter of federal law. Specifically, the President said "I challenge 
compensation committees to put an end to all company loans to corporate 
officers."93 According to his Director of Communications, Dan Bartlett, 
"President Bush looked at these loans, and the president felt the best way to 
do it was to draw a bright line; the best way to handle these loans going 
forward is through a bank. "94 
90. Press Release, Office of White House Press Secretary, Remarks by the President on Corporate 
Responsibility (July 9, 2002), available at http://www. whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/07/20020709-
4.html. 
91. /d. 
92. Hertzberg, supra note 86, at 23. 
93. Press Release, supra note 90. 
94. Jeff Gerth & Richard W. Stevenson, Bush Calls for End to Loans of a Type He Once Received, 
N.Y. TIMES, July 11, 2002, at AI. 
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Then, the first of two critical events occurred. On Wednesday, July 10, 
just one day after the President's Wall Street appearance, the Wall Street 
Journal broke the story that "Mr. Bush himself [had] borrowed money from 
Harken Energy Corp. while a company director and consultant there."95 "As 
of March 20, 1990, he [had] owed $180,375, according to Harken Energy's 
1989 annual report. "96 
The next day, Thursday, July 11, both the New York Times and 
Washington Post also reported on the below-market-rate loans.97 The inter-
national press characterized this news as "further embarrassment" for the 
President98 and "the latest skeleton to emerge from Mr. Bush's Harken cup-
board.''99 The domestic press, too, focused critically on the President's pre-
vious business behavior. 100 Suddenly, corporate scandals-and the President's 
behavior-was seen as a threat to Republicans' chances for re-election. 
Senate Republicans began to soften their resistance to meaningful reform. 101 
E. Senator Schumer Weighs In 
On Friday, July 12,2002, the second critical event in this story occurred. 
Senator Charles E. Schumer (D-N. Y), who had been present at the President's 
July 9 speech in New York City, introduced an amendment to the then-
pending Senate reform bill (the Sarbanes bill) to outlaw insider loans.102 
(Until that moment, the Sarbanes bill had merely required that public 
95. Joann S. Lublin, Loans to Corporate Officers Unlikely to Cease Soon, WAIL ST. J ., July 10, 
2002, at A8. 
96. /d. 
97. Gerth & Stevenson, supra note 94, at A1; Mike Allen, Bush Took Oil Firm's Loans as Director: 
Practice Would Be Banned in President's New Corporate Abuse Policy, WASH. POST, July II, 2002, at 
AI. 
98. Lydia Adetunji, Bush Faces Embarrassment Over Loans: Harken Energy White House 
Confirms President Received Money from Houston-Based Oil Group to Buy Shares in Compaq, FIN. 
TIMEs, July 12, 2002, at 9. 
99. Rupert Cornwell, Bush Received Loans He Now Wants Banned, THE INDEPENDENT (London), 
July 12, 2002, at 13. 
100. See Michael Kranish & John Aloysius Farrell, Bush's Business Career-A Study in Using 
Connections-Critics Look Anew at Bush's Dealings, BOSTON GLOBE, July 12, 2002, at A1; Ron Scherer, 
Growing Scrutiny of Bush Business Record, CHRISTIAN SCI. MON., July 12, 2002, at 2; Jim Landers & G. 
Robert Hillman, Harken Deal Puts Pressure on Bush: Some Say Reluctance to Yield Records Hurting 
Corporate Crackdown, Aide Decries Politics, DAU.AS MORNING NEWS, July 12, 2002, at lA. 
101. See Alison Mitchell, A New (Election Year) Vigilance on Corporations, N.Y. TIMES, July 11, 
2002, at Cl (noting the Republicans' about-face on many corporate reform issues and observing that 
suddenly, proposed Senate legislation was "becoming tougher by the hour"). 
102. This amendment was one of only three amendments to the Sarbanes bill that was permitted to 
go to the floor. "Senate staffers made clear that the uproar over Bush's loans from Harken ensured that the 
Schumer proposal went to the front of the line." David Ivanovich, Senate Targets Execs' Loans: Ban on 
Aid from Companies OK'd, HOUSTONCHRON., July 13, 2002, at Al. 
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companies disclose all insider loans).103 In advancing his amendment, Senator 
Schumer noted that he had secured the support of the White House before 
submitting the amendment. He said: 
Madam President, I am going to be very brief because I know we 
do not have too much time and we have other business. I thank both 
the majority and minority managers, Senator Sarbanes and Senator 
Gramm, for their work on this amendment. I have also spoken to 
people in the White House who were supportive of this amendment. 
It is a very simple amendment. It basically says that with certain 
narrow exceptions, CEOs and CFOs of companies will not be able to 
get loans from those companies. 
The question is: Why can't these super rich corporate executives 
go to the comer bank, the Sun Trust's or Bank of America's, like 
everyone else to take loans?104 
With no discussion, the amendment then passed on a voice vote. 105 And 
on Monday, July 15, 2002, the Senate unanimously passed out the Sarbanes 
bill, including Senator Schumer's anti-loan amendment.106 As Senator 
Schumer conceded at the time, his amendment "never would have passed two 
weeks ago."107 Indeed, just five days before passage of the bill, the Wall 
Street Journal had declared insider loans "too popular to disappear anytime 
soon.''108 
F. Getting the Deal Done 
The White House immediately began applying pressure to House 
Republicans to work to achieve a compromise between the (less aggressive) 
House version of the reform bill and the (more aggressive) Senate version. 
President Bush urged the players to reach agreement quickly: "The two 
103. Kathryn Stewart Lehman, Recent Development, Executive Compensation Following the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of2002, 81 N.C. L. REv. 2115,2117 (2003). 
104. 148 CONG. REC. S6690 (daily ed. July 12, 2002) (statement of Sen. Schumer). In the press 
release from his office, he asked a similar question: "Why do executives at Adelphia, Enron and WorldCom 
need to borrow money from their stockholders? Why can't they go to the bank like everybody else?" Press 
Release, Office of Senator Charles Schumer (D-N.Y.), Schumer Efforts to Crack Down on Cheating 
Corporations Pass Senate (July 12, 2002) (on file with author). 
105. 148 CONG. REC. S 6690 (daily ed. July 12, 2002). 
106. Shailagh Murray, Bill Overhauling Audit Regulation Passes in Senate, WAIL ST. J., July 16, 
2002, at A3. 
107. Jerry Zremski, Bill OK'd to Prohibit Loans to Executives, BUFFALO NEWS, July 13,2002, at AI. 
108. Joann S. Lublin, Questioning the Books: The President Speaks: Loans to Corporate Officers 
Unlikely to Cease Soon, WAIL ST. J., July 10,2002, at AS. 
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[chambers] need to get together as quickly as possible and get me a bill that 
I can sign before the August recess," 109 he said. In response, the House 
quickly passed a bill that would increase the penalties for economic crimes. 
While the Senate bill passed just the day before had set a maximum penalty 
of 10 years in prison, the new House bill set the maximum at 25 years.110 This 
signaled a significant change of heart-described by one commentator as a 
"death bed conversion"111-among House Republicans since the House bill 
had passed on April24. As Senator Sarbanes noted, "[ w ]hen the House acted 
three months ago, we did not yet know the full depth and extent of the 
problems."112 
Between July 16 and July 25, the Senate and House conferees, in con-
sultation with the White House, worked to reach an acceptable compromise. 
Since the first of July, the Dow Jones Industrial Average had fallen 1000 
points, and public opinion polls increasingly echoed the public's concern over 
corporate scandals. 113 On Friday, July 12, the Office and Management and 
Budget had announced that, instead of running a small surplus in FY 2002, the 
government now expected a deficit of $165 billion. 114 Suddenly, it became 
obvious to even the toughest of Republicans-including those in the White 
House who were leery of the Sarbanes bill-that the free-market ideologues 
would have to give way. 
"We've got to look out for ourselves first and foremost," a top House 
Republican strategist told The Washington Post. "We have to go home in a 
week and say we've done something. People have to wake up and realize the 
political nature of this fight." 
In a report distributed on Capitol Hill, a prominent Republican polling 
frrm found that "the bottom has fallen out on the mood of the country." In the 
pollsters' view, "World Com's [bankruptcy] announcement may have been the 
straw that broke the camel's back." It certainly broke the stock market's back. 
109. Murray, supra note 106, at A3. 
110. Shailagh Murray, House GOP Moves on Oversight Bill, with Few Changes, WALL ST. J. , July 
19,2002, at A3. 
Ill. Dierdre Sesgrean, Gephardt Stresses Economy at Cross-Country Stops, ST. LOUIS POST-
DISPATCH, Sept. 2, 2002, at AI. 
112. Press Release, United States Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 
Remarks of Senator Paul S. Sarbanes, Chairman, Senate Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs Committee 
on the Passage of the "Public Company Accounting Reform and Investor Protection Act of2002" (July 15, 
2002), at www .senate.gov/-sarbanes/pages/press/071502_bill_passage.html. 
113. See William Booth, Economic Anxiety Worries Politicians; As Elections Approach, Voters May 
Be Looking for Someone to Blame, WASH. POST, July 21,2002, at AI (citing polling data showing that 35 
percent of respondents in July listed the economy as the nation's most important issue, compared with 24 
percent a month earlier). 
114. Richard W. Stevenson, White House Says It Expects Deficit to Hit $165 Billion, N.Y. TIMES, 
July 13, 2002, at AI. 
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"Voters' attitudes toward corporate offenders are hostile," the report warned. 
"Legislation punishing wrongdoers can't be too tough."115 
According to one Republican member of Congress, 
By the time it got to conference, Republicans were under instructions 
from the speaker of the House and most political operatives to get a 
bill and get it now. There was a mad dash to embrace the Sarbanes 
bill. They didn't want to get into a fight where Republicans were 
arguing for a weaker bill. None of the troops in the House were 
prepared to support that effort. 116 
At this point, even protectionist lobbying faltered. Where once the 
lobbyists had counted on a stalemate between the House and the Senate, 
deferring a vote at least until 2003,117 now they scrambled to carve out just "a 
few strategic changes" in the Sarbanes bill.118 "'The enormity of pressure to 
get this done before the weekend suggests anyone like me had better narrow 
down the scope of things they're going to try to influence,' said Bruce Josten, 
the Chamber of Commerce's chief lobbyist."119 
Finally, on Thursday, July 25, 2002, a deal having been hanunered out, 
a consensus bill based on the Sarbanes bill passed overwhelmingly in both 
chambers.120 The vote in the House was 422-3; the Senate passed it by 99-0. 
Loan prohibition was part of the package. The President signed it into law on 
Tuesday, July 30, 2002. 
IV. THE DELffiERATIVENESS NORM IN THE SENATE 
Legislation in the United States is ideally described as having three 
salient characteristics: "deliberativeness, representativeness, and accessi-
bility."121 The key word here for our purposes is "deliberativeness." In a 
perfect world, legislation is the product of a process that involves the 
balancing of competing views, considerations of numerous alternatives, and 
above all, time during which important ideas can percolate. 
115. William Schneider, Big Business Loses Its Protector, L.A. TIMES, July 28, 2002, at Ml. 
116. Carolyn Lochhead, Bush to Sign Corporate Crackdown: GOP Drops Opposition, Backs 
Tougher Version, S. F. CHRON., July 25, 2002, at AI (quoting Rep. George Miller (R-Cal.)). 
117. See Jonathan Weisman, Lobbyists Lose Clout; Business Groups Find Their Influence on Audit 
Refonn Legislation Shrinking, WASH. POST, July 23, 2002, at Al. 
118. /d. 
119. /d. 
120. Richard B. Schmitt et al., Corporate-Oversight Bill Passes, Eases Path for Investor Lawsuits, 
WALL ST. J., July 26, 2002, at Al. 
121. ABNER J. MIKV A & ERIC LANE, AN lNTRODUcriON TO STATUTORY INTERPRETATION AND THE 
LEGISLATIVE PROCESS 69 (1997). 
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The entire structure of the Congress encourages deliberativeness in the 
development of federal legislation. Recall that the framers of the Constitution 
built many speed-bumps into the legislative process-two houses of Con-
gress, 122 the Presidential veto, 123 and supermajorities in both houses for a veto 
override.124 They also created incentives for robust "speech and debate."125 
The origins of the notion that legislation is legitimate only where it is the 
product of a deliberative process traces (at a minimum) to the Federalist 
Papers. Federalist 63 expressed concern that, left unchecked, any legislative 
body "[might] be warped by strong passions or momentary interest."126 
Federalist 62 advocated a Senate with longer terms than the House, in part for 
the sake of continuity, but in part because of a concern that members of the 
House, "if left wholly to themselves, [might make] a variety of important 
errors in the exercise of their legislative trust."127 
The importance of a deliberative process focused particularly on the 
Senate: 
Most popular histories of Congress include an exchange, very likely 
apocryphal, in which Washington and Jefferson discuss the difference 
between the House and Senate. "Why did you pour that coffee into 
your saucer?" Washington asks. "To cool it," Jefferson replies. 
"Even so," Washington says, "we pour legislation into the senatorial 
saucer to cool it."128 
We also see adherence to the deliberativeness norm in the Senate today. 
Senator Joseph Biden (D-Del.) has described the Senate as "[a place where] 
you can always slow things down .... " 129 
Thus it is a surprise when the Senate acts precipitously, as it did in the 
case of the anti-loan provision. The lack of deliberativeness on this, and other 
provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, was both atypical and, in terms of 
122. U.S. CONST. art. L § I. 
123. U.S. CONST. art. L § 7, cl. 2. 
124. /d. 
125. u.s. CONST. art. L § 6, cl. l. 
126. THE FEDERALIST No. 63 (James Madison). 
127. THE FEDERALIST NO. 62 (James Madison). See also Sandra Beth Zellmer, Sacrificing Legisla-
tive Integrity at the Altar of Appropriations Riders: A Constitutional Crisis, 21 HARv. ENVTL. L. REv. 457, 
495-98 (1997): 
Indeed, the bicameral system established by the Founders and encapsulated in the 
Constitution was a response to the concern that a hasty and potentially tyrannical majority 
in the House of Representatives would act "too quickly and chaotically" if left to its own 
devices; the Senate, an indirectly elected upper house, would "use reason and judgment to 
temper the lower house's expected haste and extremism. 
128. Jeffrey Toobin, Blowing up the Senate, NEW YOR~R. Mar. 7, 2005, at 42. 
129. /d. 
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public policy, regrettable. Why? First, deliberativeness fosters incrementa-
lism rather than abrupt or sweeping change. Second, deliberativeness ensures 
that all voices-informed or otherwise-may be heard. 
Deliberativeness is not a synonym for debate, although debate may be 
one of its elements. Rather the term defines those steps of the 
legislative process that slow legislative decision-making and distance 
it from the passions and immediacy of the prevailing desires of 
individual legislators and of various constituencies. Deliberativeness · 
is intended as an anchor against change, protecting the status quo 
from precipitous upset. ... Affirmatively, deliberativeness works 
toward assuring that enacted legislation is based on a public consen-
sus on the need for, as well as the type of, change. 130 
Adherence to the deliberativeness norm typically means that time must 
be spent ascertaining other legislators' values, considering alternatives, 
receiving input from constituents and various interest groups, and forging a 
genuine consensus. As much as deliberativeness was important in the 1780s, 
it is even more so now, given our polarized national values and an increasingly 
diverse electorate. In such a setting, says Eric Lane, legislators must often 
slow down to consider competing ideas and values beyond the immediate 
issue or their personal experience: 
[l]egislators ... must consider an array of factors in arriving at their 
decisions, including: the views of their colleagues and constituents, 
the historical setting for the proposal; the impact on other regulatory 
or redistributive schemes; and internal politics.131 
None of these items had time to surface in the minutes between introduction 
and passage of the anti-loan provision. 
Critics, of course, have recognized many exceptions to the deliberative-
ness norm. Spending limitation riders, 132 so-called "Christmas tree" legisla-
tion, 133 and the appropriations process itself134 all elude the type of measured 
130. Mikva & Lane, supra note 121, at 677. 
131. Eric Lane, Essay, Men Are Not Angels: The Realpolitik of Direct Democracy and What We Can 
Do About It, 34 Wll.LAME'ITE L. REv. 579, 594 (1998). 
132. See Neal E. Devins, Regulation of Government Agencies Through Limitation Riders, 1987 
DUKE L. J. 456 (1987) (criticizing the use of spending limits or threatened budget cuts as a means of 
shaping policy without adequate public input). 
133. See Brannon P. Denning & Brooks R. Smith, Uneasy Rider: The Case for a Truth-in-Legislation 
Amendment, 1999 UTAH L. REv. 957,971,998 (describing the process by which members of Congress 
trade favors and add special interest provisions to a "must-pass" bill at the last minute). 
134. Devins, supra note 132, at 458 ("appropriations are often acted on quickly, providing little 
opportunity for thoughtful deliberation of the issues raised by such measures."). See also Michelle V. 
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deliberation that serious legislation deserves. Still, these devices are "not a 
favored vehicle for public policymaking in a representative democracy."135 
V. WHAT DELIBERATIVENESS MIGHT HAVE REVEALED 
We know from the legislative history of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act that 
Congress did not deliberate at all about the anti-loan provision. As a thought 
exercise, however, let us assume that the provision had been proposed in, say, 
March, 2002. Indeed, let us assume that President Bush had made statutory 
loan prohibition one of the elements of his corporate governance reform 
proposal in March, 2002. What might a thoughtful Congressional inquiry 
have revealed? 
First, as a backdrop, it would have been clear that, after a rich and fitful 
history, 136 corporate loans in 2002 were treated in four different ways, 
depending on a company's state of incorporation: (1) some states prohibited 
insider loans;137 (2) some states required specific procedures for the approval 
of insider loans; 138 (3) 29 states, including Delaware, permitted insider loans 
only where the board (at least in theory) could identify a corporate benefit 
from making the loan;139 and (4) 19 states, following the most recent version 
of the Model Business Corporation Act, had totally deregulated insider loans. 
Of the eight "problem companies" whose stories led up to enactment of the 
anti-loan provision, three-WorldCom, Tyco, and Global Crossing-were 
incorporated in a "deregulated" jurisdiction. 140 This evidence might have 
Lacko, Comment, The Data Quality Act, Prologue to a Farce or a Tragedy?, 53 EMORY L. J. 305, 305 
(2004) (describing an appropriations rider as "a figurative needle in the haystack of a voluminous document 
detailing the federal government's budgetary allocations for [the coming fiscal year]"); Sidney A. Shapiro, 
The Information Quality Act and Environmental Protection: The Perils ojRejonn by Appropriations Rider, 
28 WM. & MARY ENvTL. L. & PoL'Y REv. 339, 339 (2004) (characterizing important legislation as having 
been "hidden in a few paragraphs of a very large appropriations bill"). 
135. Thomas 0. McGarity & Sidney A. Shapiro, OSHA's Critics and Regulatory Rejonn, 31 WAKE 
FORESTL. REv. 587,642 (1996). 
136. See Barnard, supra note 14, at 240-50 (tracing history). 
137. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE§ 30-3-82 (Michie 2004). 
138. See, e.g., CAL. CoRP. CODE§ 315 (West 2005) (requiring shareholder approval of loans to 
directors, or for corporations with 100 or more shareholders, requiring shareholder approval of a bylaw 
authorizing loans); S.D. CODIFIED LAws§ 47-2-65 (Michie 2003) (requiring shareholder approval ofloans 
to directors). 
139. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 143 (2005) (permitting loans to officers and directors, 
"whenever, in the judgment of the directors, such loan, guaranty or assistance may reasonably be expected 
to benefit the corporation"); FLA. STAT. ANN.§ 607.0833 (West 2005). 
140. WorldCom was incorporated in Georgia. Tyco and Global Crossing were incorporated in 
Bermuda. Quite apart from anti-loan sentiment, the offshore incorporation ofTyco and Global Crossing 
was a subject of widespread condemnation. See Christopher Lee, Companies That Relocate to Avoid 
Income Taxes Come Under Fire, DAlLAS MORNING NEWS, July 14, 2002, at 15A (discussing proposed 
legislation to punish offshore companies). 
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suggested that unwise and permissive state laws had played some role in the 
growth and abuse of insider loans. 
Second, it would have been clear that the use of insider loans had 
burgeoned during the 1990s, in part due to the "arms race" of executive 
compensation during that period, and in part due to some quirks of the federal 
income tax law. (Specifically, receiving a loan rather than a direct cash 
payment permits an executive to avoid short -term income tax obligations.) As 
of 2002, "more than one-third of the largest publicly traded corporations [had 
entered] into over $4 billion in low interest loan agreements with [their] 
corporate executives."141 
Third, it would have been clear that the nature and magnitude of insider 
loans had changed dramatically since the 1980s. For example, the 
descriptions of insider loans in a 1988 study included simple cash advances 
against salary, loans made to purchase life insurance, loans made to purchase 
a new house, loans made to purchase stock, loans made to facilitate the 
exercise of stock options, and "expense advances."142 The amounts involved 
ranged from less than $5000 to $2.5 million.143 In contrast, by 2002, insider 
loans often ran into the tens of millions of dollars. One study of these loans 
found the mean amount for loans made to facilitate the purchase of company 
shares alone to be $2.5 million. 144 
Fourth, it might have been possible for the Congressional staff to do 
some empirical data-gathering to see if insider loans were associated dispro-
portionately with failing companies or were spread more broadly across the 
market. I did a shirttail version of such a study in the spring of 2003. Looking 
at the 50 public companies identified by Business Week as the "Best Per-
formers" of 2002,145 I found that 10 of them, or 20% of the total, reported 
having made or retained insider loans to their officers and directors during the 
preceding year. Then, looking at the 195 public companies that entered 
141. McClendon, supra note II, at 998. (Other consultants' studies reported different numbers, but 
all agreed that the trend of making insider loans was strongly upward.). See Joann S. Lublin, Loan 
Dangers: Companies Are Having Second Thoughts About Lending Money to Their Top Executives, WALL 
ST. J., April12, 2001, at R6 ("Nearly 14% of214 major public companies extended credit for executive 
officers' stock purchases in 1999, up from 8.4% in 1994, according to a proxy-statement analysis by New 
York compensation consultants William M. Mercer Inc."); Joann S. Lublin, Loans to Corporate Officers 
Unlikely to Cease Soon, WAU. ST. J., July 10, 2002, at A8 ("About 412 of 1,000 U.S. corporations lent 
money to certain top executives from 1991 to 2000-up from the 225 doing so in 1981 to 1990, concludes 
an analysis by consultants Executive Compensation Advisory Services in Alexandria, Va."). 
142. Barnard, supra note 14, app. D. 
143. ld. 
144. Khuldeep Shastri & Kathleen M. Kahle, Executive Loans, in AFA 2004 San Diego Meetings: 
EFA 2003 Annual Conference Paper No. 184, at 10, Feb. 2003, at http://ssm.com/abstract=423447. 
145. The Best Performers, Bus. WEEK, Special Annual Issue, Spring 2003. 
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Chapter 11 in 2002,146 I found that 49 of them, or 25% of the total, reported 
having made or retained insider loans during the preceding year. These 
findings suggest that companies regarded as "winners" were just about as 
likely to have made an insider loan as companies regarded as "losers." 
With a little more time, empirical data-gathering might have revealed 
additional important facts. Two studies published some months after enact-
ment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act examined insider loans using rigorous 
methods. One study detailed the use of insider loans from 1996-2000 and con-
cluded that loans made to facilitate stock purchases were often diverted to 
other uses. 147 Another study found a "strong negative relationship between 
industry-adjusted returns and [the presence of insider] loans."148 
Fifth, Congressional hearings-and a thoughtful analysis of the data 
presented-might have reinforced the recognition that not all insider loans 
were harmful, or even suspect. Hundreds of such loans each year were repaid 
in full by the borrowers, or were being repaid over time pursuant to a 
repayment schedule. Other loans were made in small amounts, or to facilitate 
desirable corporate transactions. Many insider loans facilitated the purchase 
of company shares, which scholars have argued is a desirable method of 
aligning management's interests with those of shareholders.149 Many of these 
loans, in short, were totally harmless and/or advanced a legitimate corporate 
purpose. 
With time, it would have been possible-and it still is possible-to 
consider insider loans along six dimensions: (1) the terms of the loan; (2) the 
purpose for the loan; (3) the size of the loan; (4) the company's expectations 
for repayment of the loan; (5) the manner of approval of the loan; and (6) 
whether or not the loan was adequately disclosed to investors. 
A. Terms of the loan 
Insider loans may be categorized by their terms. These range from fully-
competitive market terms (including interest rate, duration of the loan, and 
covenants) of the sort that a borrower could negotiate from a bank or finance 
company to fully uncompetitive (non-interest bearing, indefinite term, 
unsecured) loans of the sort that a legitimate bank would never make. 
146. The identity of these companies was provided by BankruptcyData.com research. 
147. Shastri & Kahle, supra note 144, at 25. 
148. Elizabeth A. Gordon et al., Related Party Transactions: Associations with Corporate 
Governance and Finn Value, in EFA 2004 Maastricht Meetings Paper No. 4377, at 6, Aug. 2004, at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=558983. 
149. See, e.g., Charles M. Elson, The Duty of Care, Compensation, and Stock Ownership, 63 U. CIN. 
L. REv. 649, 695 (1995) (suggesting that directors be paid primarily in stock rather than cash, because 
doing so aligns their interests with that of shareholders). 
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B. Purpose of the loan 
Loans may represent purposes intrinsic to the corporation's business 
(such as loans made to facilitate executive relocation) or involving some form 
of reward for executive performance (loans made to facilitate the "cashless" 
exercise of stock options). They may also include more generalized forms of 
incentives (short-term loans made to facilitate the purchase of life insurance) 
or they may advance a purpose that is, frankly, not even vaguely related to the 
corporation's business (loans, such as those made to Bernie Ebbers, made to 
facilitate outside investments). 
C. Size of the loan 
Loans may be measured by the amount of money involved. Loans that 
are proportionate to the borrower's base salary (such as travel advances or 
modest relocation loans) are at one end of this spectrum and multimillion 
dollar loans far in excess of the borrower's base salary are at the other. 
D. Expectation of repayment 
Insider loans may also be categorized by the company's expectations for 
repayment. In most cases, the expectation is for complete repayment pursuant 
to the terms of the loan, whatever those terms might include. In other cases, 
repayment may be nominally expected, but may also be forgiven if certain 
events occur. 150 In still other cases, there is the wholly illusory loan for which 
no repayment is expected. Such loans, according to the IRS, should be treated 
as straight compensation.151 
E. Manner of approval 
There is yet a fifth dimension to insider loans, having to do with the 
manner in which the loan is approved. This ranges from thoughtful authori-
zation by disinterested members of the board of directors (in possession of full 
information), to a casual rubber stamp by the board, to outright misappro-
priation by the borrower without authorization by or notice to the board. 
(Significantly, this last type of transaction is not really a loan at all). 
150. See, e.g., E. Scott Reckard, Big Perks Put Seven CEOs in a Whole "Other" Club, L.A. TIMEs, 
June 6, 2004, at C4 (describing the "golden hello" given the new CEO ofMattel, Inc. in 2000, when he was 
given a $5.5 million loan "with an agreement to erase the debt if he lasted three years on the job"); In re 
Integrated Health Servs., 2001 Bankr. LEXIS 100 (D. Del.) (noting that the CEO of the company had been 
given a $34.5 million loan, which would be "forgiven over time according to a set formula") . 
15l. See Joseph E. Bachelder Ill, Tax Treatment of Loans to Executives, 2001 HoT IsSUES IN 
EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION, 719 (describing IRS treatment of some executive loans as compensation). 
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F. Disclosure 
The sixth dimension for assessing an insider loan has to do with how and 
to what extent the loan r~lationship is disclosed to investors. Some loans of 
the pre-Sarbanes-Oxley period were fully disclosed and carefully described 
in public filings. 152 Others were alluded to somewhere, though often buried 
in a footnote to the financial statements, rather than described in plain English 
in the compensation section of the document. 153 Others were not disclosed 
at all.154 
As shown below, by plotting these considerations graphically, it would 
have been easy to see that some types of insider loans-those described in 
Column #1-were likely to be entirely legitimate exercises of business judg-
ment which would present no problems to the integrity of the market. Other 
loans-those described in Column #2-might be more questionable and might 
require some legislative response. But only the "Column #3" loans would be 
the sort of loans for which federal prohibition might be appropriate. 
Column #1 Column #2 Column #3 
Terms Bank-like terms Below-market "Sweetheart" terms 
interest rates, etc. (No-interest loans) 
Purpose Key to a corporate Indirectly supportive Unrelated to any 
objective of a corporate corporate goals 
objective 
Magnitude Proportionate to salary Generous Outlandish 
Repayment Intent to collect Intent to forgive 
Approval Advance approval by Pro forma approval Funds are 
disinterested members after the loan is misappropriated 
of the board disbursed without notice to the 
board 
Disclosure Fully disclosed Obfuscated Undisclosed 
Finally, had they been given the opportunity to do so, Congressional 
staffers might have developed one additional set of data. An important study 
published after the passage of Sarbanes-Oxley suggests that insider loans were 
152. See, e.g., Conseco, Inc,. Proxy Statement, Apr. 30,2001, at 16-17 ("Certain Relationships and 
Related Transactions"); Comdisco, Inc., Proxy Statement, Dec. 29, 2000, at 15 ("Comdisco Executive 
Officer Compensation and Benefits"). 
153. See, e.g., Microsoft's Failure to Disclose Loan May Be a Violation of the lAw, S.F. CHRON., 
Sept. 10, 2002, at B I (noting that a $15 million loan to the company's chief operating officer was disclosed 
in a footnote, though in impenetrable terms that did not include the word "loan"). 
154. Apparently, the loans at Tyco were not included in the firm's public filings. Ben White, Tyco 
Repons Paints Picture of Greed: CEO Kozlowski Allegedly Deceived Firm's Board, WASH. POST, Sept. 
17, 2001 , at El. 
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only one of several value-reducing practices at public companies in 2000-
2001.155 Other types of "related party transactions" occurred more than three 
times as often as insider loans. As Mark Lowenstein has pointed out, 
"[w]hether [insider] loans were the most abused form of compensation, and 
thus a logical place for Congress to start, is questionable."156 
Here's the bottom line: had Congress in the spring of2002 taken a hard 
look at the universe of insider loans (or even a quick look), it would have 
identified several alternatives to a statutory prohibition of insider loans at 
public companies. These included, in ascending order of invasiveness: (1) 
enforcing existing disclosure laws so as to discourage the making of "Column 
#3" -type loans; (2) toughening the disclosure laws by federal statute or regula-
tion to capture more fully the problems of "Column #3"-type loans; (3) 
imposing new federal regulations on insider loans-such as mandating pre-
approval or collection procedures-in addition to the existing disclosure 
requirements; (4) prohibiting certain types of "Column #3"-type loans (for 
example, non-interest bearing loans or loans in an amount of more than 20% 
of the executive's annual base pay); and (5) prohibiting insider loans with 
specific undesirable characteristics.157 Some or all of these approaches might 
well have made more sense than the "death penalty" approach that Congress 
ultimately selected. 
VI. OPPORTUNISM AND IMAGERY 
There is much one might say about successful politicians. They are typi-
cally gregarious; need little sleep; can tolerate endless, repetitive encounters 
with strangers; and are often quick to identify "signature" issues with which 
to enhance their public visibility. Good politicians know the value of langu-
age, too.158 Not only do they perfect the art of the "sound bite," they also seize 
155. Gordon et al., supra note 148, at 51. 
156. Mark J. Lowenstein, The Quiet TransfontUltion of Corporate Law, 51 SMU L. REv. 353, 361 
(2004). 
157. All these proposals assume that federal, rather than state, action is the most appropriate locus 
of reform. It would also have been possible to identify several reform items at the state level, i.e, (l) 
requiring specific approval procedures for all insider loans as a matter of state law; (2) requiring specific 
terms and collection procedures for all insider loans as a matter of state law; (3) penalizing ''Column #3" 
loans both by state statute and state decisional law; and (4) prohibiting ''Column #3" loans. 
158. See John Comer & Dick Pels, The Re-Styling of Politics, in MEDIA AND THE REsTYLING OF 
PoLmcs (2003) at 11 ("Finding the 'right' kind of language to address particular audiences on specific 
topics is among the primary challenges to those seeking and holding political office"). 
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upon powerful imagery in the bills they introduce159 and the campaign slogans 
they use in their campaigns. 160 
Senator Chuck Schumer is a very successful politician. In his most 
recent re-election campaign in November, 2004, he received over 70% of the 
vote. 161 
There are many reasons Senator Schumer is successful. According to 
one Democratic consultant, "[n]o one works harder. He travels incessantly. 
He's well-liked upstate. He understands the value of money in politics. He 
is the consummate politician."162 
But there is more to Senator Schumer's success than hard work and well-
honed skills. Senator Schumer "has distinguished himself by his persistent 
cultivation of media attention for populist-style fights." 163 This instinct for a 
popular issue, coupled with his ability to command media attention at 
precisely the right moment in the news cycle, both contributed to Senator 
Schumer's embrace of the anti-loan provision. 
Vll. CONRJSION AND REGRET 
Since the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, confusion has arisen on a 
number of issues arguably governed by the anti-loan provision. For example, 
what is the relationship between the anti-loan provision and state indemnifi-
cation laws that permit the advancement of attorneys' fees and expenses? Is 
it possible that the (routine) practice of advancing legal fees to officers and 
directors to defend lawsuits against them may now constitute an unlawful loan 
in violation of the anti-loan provision?164 
Or, what is the impact of the anti-loan provision on the practice of 
facilitating arrangements by which executives can easily exercise their accu-
159. See, e.g., Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to End the Exploitation of Children Today 
(PROTECT) Act of2003, Pub. L. No. 108-21, 117 Stat. 650 (2003); Uniting and Strengthening America 
by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 
2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001); Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 
Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996). 
160. See, e.g. Presidential Campaign Slogans, at http://www.presidentsusa.net/campaignslogans 
.html ("Putting People First" (William Clinton); "A Leader, for a Change" (Jimmy Carter); and "Reformer 
With Results" (George W. Bush)). 
161. Michael Slackman, Schumer Wins, and the Speculation Grows, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 4, 2004, at 
P2. 
162. Dionne Searcey, Schumer Looking Ahead: Confident in His Bid for Re-election, the Incumbent 
Senator May Have Sights Set on Gubernatorial Race, NEWSDAY, Oct. 21, 2004, at A20 (quoting 
Democratic consultant Hank Sheinkopf). 
163. Mike Doming & Rick Pearson, Blagojevich Finds Role Model: N.Y. Senator's Ways Followed, 
CHI. TRIB., May 2, 2004, at C I . 
164. Sean Carnathan, Will the Company Cover an Ex-Officer's Legal Costs? The New World of 
Sarbanes-Oxley, 13 Bus. LAW TODAY 33 (2003). 
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mulated stock options? When officers or directors engage in a "cashless 
exerciseH of their options-an exercise of the options followed by an 
immediate sale of some portion of the stock to cover the exercise price-is 
that a violation of the anti-loan provision?165 
Or, what is the impact of the anti-loan provision on the once-common 
practice of purchasing so-called "split-dollar" life insurance coverage for 
senior-level executives? When a company pays the premium for a life 
insurance policy that is later reimbursed by the executive when she retires (for 
a while, this was a tax-favored strategy), is that a violation of the anti-loan 
provision ?166 
In the immediate aftermath of Sarbanes-Oxley' s passage, these and other 
questions quickly surfaced. 167 Practitioners were hard-pressed to give useful 
advice to their clients, and often conflicting advice was the result. 168 The 
insurance industry sought interpretive guidance from the SEC, 169 which the 
Commission refused to supply.170 It also sought assistance and corrective 
legislation from Congress, which the Congressmen, too, refused to supply. 171 
Then, something remarkable happened. Lacking any useful guidance 
from the SEC or from Congress, a self-appointed group of lawyers from 
twenty-five law firms across the country decided to draft their own guidance 
document. 172 Though this project has been criticized as a possible violation 
165. Robert A. Barron, Has Sarbanes-Oxley Killed the Broker-Assisted Cashless Exercise for Section 
I6 Insiders?, 30 SEC. REG. L. J. 440, 487 (Winter 2002); John T. Bostelman et al., Cashless Exercise, 
Indemnification, and Other Permissible Activities Under Section 402 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, THE 
CORP. Gov. ADVISOR, Nov/Dec. 2002, at 26. 
166. See Jeremy Kahn, Suddenly Some Perks Aren't Worth the Pain, FORTIJNE, Nov. 11, 2002, at 
40 (noting that both the law's sponsors, Senator Paul Sarbanes and Congressman Michael Oxley, "never 
intended to bar split-dollar insurance policies," but that most companies had ceased to provide them). 
167. Martin E. Lybecker et al., Section 402 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act: The Devil May Have Been 
the Draftsman, W AU ST. LAWYER, Oct. 2002, at 1. 
168. See Sarbanes-Oxley Should Not Preclude All Broker-Assisted Cashless Option Exercises by 
Insiders, at http://www .reedsmith.comllibrary/publication View.cfm?itemid=3744 (noting that "[a]lthough 
some law firms have advised public issuers to suspend broker-assisted cashless stock option exercises for 
executive officers and directors in light of Section 402 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, we believe, subject to 
certain limitations, that such suspension is not necessary''). 
169. See Industry Battling Multiple Reverses on Split-Dollar, COU Life Sector Products, INS. 
CHRON., Sept. 2, 2002 (noting that the insurance industry was seeking an SEC interpretation of the anti-
loan provision that would exempt split-dollar insurance products from its coverage). 
170. Lybecker et al., supra note 167, at 1 ("[S]enior members of the [SEC] staff have made it clear 
that the Commission is not likely to issue any interpretive guidance regarding [the anti-loan provision] (at 
last not in the near future, and that they expect members of the practicing bar to resolve the questions"). 
171. See Split-Dollar Fix Eyed on Pension Bill, INs. CHRON, Sept. 9, 2002 (noting lobbyists' efforts 
to secure statutory protection for split-dollar life insurance products); Hill Pressure Threatens Split Dollar, 
INs. CHRON., Sept. 30, 2002 (noting that the industry's efforts secure an exemption for split-dollar life 
insurance products "appeared doomed to failure"). 
172. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act: Interpretive Issues Under§ 402-Prohibition of Certain Insider 
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of the antitrust laws, 173 it was in fact an inspired act of self-preservation on the 
lawyers' part. With no useful legislative history to guide them, and many 
unanswered questions, the lawyers tried to craft a coherent interpretation of 
the statute that would withstand judicial scrutiny and also permit critical 
corporate transactions to go forward. Specifically, the document suggested 
that routine travel advances and relocation loans should not be treated as 
"personal loans." 174 It also encouraged certain types of retention loans"175 and 
suggested that the advancement of fees and expenses in litigated proceedings 
should not be subject to the anti-loan provision. 176 "While the SEC didn't 
sanction the memo, it didn't criticize it either, leading some lawyers to believe 
their take on the [anti-loan provision] was correct."177 
Still, questions remained. One year after the statute was passed, Con-
gressman Oxley expressed "trepidation" about the anti-loan provision "and 
said he would like to see Congress clarify what it meant." 178 Senator Sarbanes 
"[didn't] share Mr. Oxley's concems."179 And both agreed it was still too 
soon to make any legislative changes.180 
Ultimately, the SEC did provide some clarification as regards the legiti-
macy of foreign bank loans to bank executives. 181 And the Department of 
Labor provided some clarification as regards the application of the anti-loan 
provision to ERISA plans. 182 With those exceptions, however, there has been 
no official clarification of the scope and reach of the anti-loan provision. 
Thus, questions remain as to hundreds of millions of dollars in outstanding 
loans to officers and directors. 183 Some of these loans are being forgiven 
pursuant to pre-arranged schedules. Others are being paid off with the 
passage of time. 
Loans, at www .mayerbrown.com/sarbanesoxley/interpretiveissuesundersec402. pdf. 
173. Mark R. Patterson, Law-Fixing: Should Lawyers Agree How to Interpret Statutes?, in Fordham 
School of Law, PUB-LAW Research Papers No. 50, at 18-9, May 5, 2004, at 
http://ssm.com/abstract=555706. 
174. Sarbanes-Oxley Act: Interpretive Issues Under§ 402-Prohibition of Certain Insider Loans, 
supra note 172, at 3. 
175. ld. at 4-5. 
176. ld. 
177. Deborah Solomon, Sarbanes and Oxley Agree to Disagree, WAll. ST. J., July 24, 2003, at Cl. 
178. /d. 
179. ld. 
180. ld. ('They said corporate America needs more time to digest the rules before a final verdict on 
the law's effectiveness can be reached and potential weaknesses spotted"). 
181. SEC Adopts Fund Disclosure Rules and Foreign Bank Loan Exemption; Proposes Shell 
Company Rules, at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2004-50.htm. 
182. Field Assistance Bulletin 2003-1, Aprill5, 2003. 
183. Louis Lavelle, Executive Loans: A Long Good-Bye, Bus. WK., Feb. 2, 2004, at 12. 
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VID. WHAT NEXT? 
Some critics have decried the Sarbanes-Oxley Act as imposing "quack 
corporate governance" rules on thousands ofU.S. public coinpanies.184 Others 
have faulted the Act for failing to disrupt the "social status quo" of U.S. 
corporate hierarchies and boards of directors. 185 Still others have raised 
federalism concerns, 186 worried that the Act just imposes more of the same 
kind of regulations that failed to work in the past, 187 and lamented the Act's 
impact on a dwindling pool of qualified corporate directors. 188 Executives 
complain constantly about the difficulty of meeting the Act's requirements. 189 
I am more optimistic about the Act as a whole than some of these critics, 
but wary of some of the smaller pieces of the Act that were poured into it at 
the last minute190-"cobbled together" as one critic says191-without the kind 
of thought and deliberation we should reasonably expect of our lawmakers. 
The anti-loan provision is one such piece. 
So, what to do now? Roberta Romano has urged that the anti-loan 
provision (along with several other provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act) be 
made a default rule which could be waived by individual corporations.192 
Others would suggest outright repeal. 
I suggest two other alternatives. First, Congress should conduct a 
thoughtful study of the three issues that have generated the most pressing 
concerns among public company executives and their lawyers: advancement 
of fees and expenses in derivative litigation, cashless exercise of stock 
184. Romano, supra note 9, at 8. 
185. James Fanto, Whistleblowing and the Public Director: Countering Corporate Inner Circles, 
83 ORE. L. REv. 435,533 (2004). 
186. Larry Ribstein, Market vs. Regulatory Responses to Corporate Fraud: A Critique of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of2002, 28 IOWAJ. CORP. L. 1,58 (2002); William B. Chandler ill & Leo E. Strine, 
Jr. The New Federalism of the American Corporate Governance System: Preliminary Reflections of Two 
Residents of One Small State, 152 U. PENN. L. REV. 953, 971-72 (2003)(describing Section 402 as "a type 
of limitation that more traditional minds might think should flow from the chartering states, rather than 
from the federal government"). 
187. Joan MacLeod Herninway, Enron's Tangled Web: Complex Relationships. Unanswered 
Questions, 71 U. CIN. L. REv. 1167, 1182 (2003). 
188. E. Norman Veasey, Counseling Directors in the New Corporate Culture, 59 Bus. LAw. 1447, 
1452 (2004). 
189. See, e.g., Ellen McCarthy & Carrie Johnson, Law Makes Company Account for Past Sins, 
WASH. POST, Mar. 7, 2005, at El (quoting the CEO of BearingPoint Inc. concerning the burden of 
complying with the Act). 
190. See Ribstein, supra at 186, at 19 (noting that the Sarbanes-Ox1ey Act ''was passed in a hectic 
environment in which politicians played on public misperceptions of risk and eschewed careful balancing 
of costs and benefits"). 
191. Veasey, supra note 188, at 1451. 
192. Romano, supra note 9, at 206. 
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options, and split-dollar life insurance. 193 After careful study and public 
hearings, specific amendments to the anti-loan provision might prove to be in 
order, or not. 
Second, Congress should consider a more global approach to the question 
of insider loans and explore the possibility of re-authorizing such loans, with 
a strong "corporate benefit" limitation. 
A. Give Meaning to "Corporate Benefit" 
As noted above, the current state of the law governing insider loans is 
scattered-literally-all over the map. The statutory language in 29 states 
limits insider loans to those circumstances where the board of directors can 
affirmatively find that making the loan will provide a "benefit" to the 
corporation. 194 The problem is that the states have developed almost no 
useful guidance on what is meant by the term "corporate benefit." As noted 
in my 1988 study, insider loans were often made without regard to this 
statutory requirement. 195 And these loans were rarely subject to litigation, 
because most of them were repaid. 
When issues relating to abusive insider loans were presented in litigation, 
moreover, the question of whether the statutory requirement of a "corporate 
benefit" had been met, was often not raised or decided. Thus, in Aronson v. 
Lewis, 196 the question of whether $225,000 in interest-free loans to a director 
had been properly approved by the board under Delaware law was never 
considered, because the plaintiffs failed to meet the demand requirement. And 
in Technicorp International v. Johnston, 197 a challenge to $6 million in 
interest-free loans was subsumed in a much larger case involving outright 
looting of the corporation. 198 In Integrated Health Services, Inc. v. Elkins, 199 
the question was whether the plaintiff had properly alleged that the grant and 
later forgiveness of several loans to the CEO was the product of a "conscious 
and intentional disregard" of the directors' fiduciary duties as defined in the 
Disney case. 200 (The court concluded that, with respect to some of the loans, 
193. The split-dollar life insurance issue may be less pressing than the other two, since some of the 
tax advantages of such plans have been reduced since passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. See Joseph B. 
Treaster, New Treasury Rule Taxes Some Insurance Policies, N.Y. TIMEs, Sept. 12,2003, at C5. 
194. See supra note 139 and accompanying text. 
195. Barnard, supra note 14, at 254. 
196. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805 (Del. 1984). 
197. Technicorp lnt'l ll, Inc. v. Johnston, 2000 Del. Ch. LEXIS 81 (Del. Ch. 2000). 
198. The court characterized the defendants' conduct in that case as a "pattern of massive fraudulent 
diversions of [the corporation's] assets and concealment of the same." /d. 
199. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Integrated Health Servs., Inc. v. Elkins, 2004 Del. 
Ch. LEXIS 122 (Del. Ch. 2004). 
200. In re The Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 825 A.2d 275, 289 (Del. Ch. 2003). 
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the answer was "yes.") So, even in Delaware, there has been little useful gui-
dance on which loans are likely to satisfy the "corporate benefit" requirement. 
Insider loans have sometimes surfaced in bankruptcy cases, but there the 
question has been whether the loans should be treated as fraudulent 
conveyances with respect to the corporation's creditors, and not whether the 
loans have passed the "corporate benefit" test. 201 Similar issues are occasion-
ally found in federal income tax cases, where the issue is typically whether the 
insider loan was actually a loan or whether in fact it represented taxable 
compensation202 or a constructive dividend.203 Sometimes, insider loans play 
a role in decisions to pierce the corporate veil. 204 
Only a handful of cases, however, have ever addressed the issue of 
"corporate benefit" directly, and even those that have done so, have done so 
inadequately.205 Significantly, since 1988, I have found only two cases in 
which insider loans have been challenged on their merits. 206 
So, Congress might consider adopting a federal provision, applicable to 
public companies, that would compel corporate boards to make a specific 
finding that any insider loan is likely to provide a discernible "corporate 
benefit." Fact-gathering and hearings might generate some clear guidelines 
as to what is meant by a "corporate benefit" and what types of transactions are 
presumptively illegitimate. 
Congress might decide, for example, to exclude from the "corporate 
benefit" rule any loan.s made for the purpose of purchasing stock. Or it might 
decide that retention loans and any other loans subject to an automatic 
"forgiveness schedule" are presumptively illegitimate. It might decide that 
only interest-bearing loans can satisfy a "corporate benefit" rule, regardless 
201. See, e.g., In re Flutie N.Y. Corp., 310 B.R. 31, 49 (S.D. N.Y. 2004) (treating as fraudulent 
transfers several purported "loans" to the corporate debtor's chief executive). 
202. See, e.g., Katsaros v. Comm'r, 77 T.C.M. (CCH) 1295 (holding that payments characterized by 
the taxpayer as "loans" should be treated as compensation). 
203. See, e.g., McCurley v. Comm'r, 74 T.C.M. (CCH)318 (holdingthatpaymentscharacterized by 
the taxpayer as "loans" should be treated as constructive dividends). 
204. See, e.g.,ln re Flutie N.Y. Corp., 310 B.R. at 71 (holding that CEO who received regular loans 
from the debtor in lieu of salary was the "alter ego" of the debtor and subject to individual liability). 
205. See, e.g., Oberhelman v. Barnes Inv. Corp., 236 Kan. 335, 690 P. 2d 1343 (1984) (holding 
without explanation that the loan in question could not reasonably have been expected to benefit the 
corporation); Roxbury State Bank v. The Clarendon, 129 N.J. Super. 358, 324 A.2d 24 (App. Div. 1984) 
(finding no basis to support the proposition that the corporation could reasonably be expected to benefit 
from a loan). 
206. See Group Inmobiliario Morales Franco v. Garcia, 1999 Tex. App. LEXIS 5845 (finding that 
two corporate officers who had taken out a $100,000 loan had offered no evidence to show that the loan 
benefited the corporation in any way); Dupuis v. Pierre's Sch. of Beauty Culture, Inc., 1995 Me. Super. 
LEXIS 515 (finding that outstanding loans had "provided no benefit to the corporation"). 
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of the purpose of the loans. I express no opinion on these issues here.207 
These are matters for the deliberative process. 
B. Deal with Procedural Issues 
If Congress is to revisit the question of insider loans, it not only should 
consider the substantive issue of when insider loans should be made, but also 
address procedural issues governing the grant of insider loans. These issues 
include ( 1) whether retroactive board approval of an insider loan is legitimate, 
or whether all such loans should be approved in advance; (2) whether any sort 
of "loan plan" is permissible in public companies and, if so, whether such 
plans must be subject to advance shareholder approval; (3) whether real-time 
disclosure of insider loans should be required, or whether annual disclosure 
adequately protects investors; (4) whether the terms of the loans (including 
loan forgiveness schedules) should be disclosed and, if so, using what format; 
and (5) what documentation-and forms of security-should be required in 
connection with insider loans. 
In any event, it is time for Congress to revisit the anti-loan provision. In 
comments during the question-and-answer session at this Symposium, Con-
gressman Oxley revealed that he had encouraged Senator Schumer to initiate 
that process. 
IX. CONCLUSION 
In the immediate aftermath of Sarbanes-Oxley' s passage, here's what one 
critic had to say about the anti-loan provision: 
Section 402 was adopted in haste and anger, without the normal give 
and take of the legislative process that would have occurred with 
hearings, committee reports, and debates on the floors of the House 
or Senate. The actual language used to effect the Congressional pur-
pose, such that it is, has adversely affected a broad sweep of standard 
compensation practices. In applying Draconian penalties, Congress 
made no apparent attempt to distinguish between the outrageous on 
[the] one hand, and the immaterial and customary on the other hand. 
The result has been a great deal of distress and chaos among directors 
and executive officers .... 208 
Should we care about the alleged distress today, nearly three years later? 
I suggest the answer is yes. First, the anti-loan provision is overbroad-far in 
207. In previous work, I have suggested some guidelines for determining when a "corporate benefit" 
is likely to be achieved. Barnard, supra note 14, at 261. 
208. Lybecker et al., supra note 167, at 10. 
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excess of what's necessary to curb misconduct. Second, corporations have 
already found numerous ways of circumventing the provision at shareholders' 
expense. 209 Third, if Congress intended by enacting this provision even 
indirectly to curb increases in executive compensation, that effort has failed. 210 
Finally, legislation like this, which emerges without the benefit of a 
deliberative process, casts doubt on the seriousness with which members of 
Congress approach their important legislative work. In the case of the anti-
loan provision, they can do better. 
209. For example, even though retention loans may have disappeared, retention bonuses have not. 
That is, rather than making a loan with a forgiveness schedule, public companies since Sarbanes-Oxley 
have been paying retention bonuses. The only difference is in the timing of the taxable event. The same 
thing has happened with split-dollar life insurance. See Lawrence A. Cunningham, 11re Sarbanes-Oxley 
Yawn, supra note 7, at 961 (noting that, instead of utilizing split-dollar life insurance policies, "[t]he 
emerging solution ... is to classify [the payment of premiums] as a bonus . . .. "). As for loans to facilitate 
the purchase of stock, "[e]xecutive compensation committees are using cash bonuses, restricted stock 
grants, and phantom stock grants to replace stock purchases financed with loans." Ashlea Ebeling, 11re 
Lending Game, FORBES, May 10,2004, at 182. 
210. See Claudia H. Deutsch, My Big Fat C.E.O. Paycheck, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 3, 2005, at§ 3, p. I 
(tracking recent rises in CEO compensation). 
